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This paper considers both incentive and sorting effects of a pro- 
motion tournament, and analyzes the optimal degree of uncertainty 
in the agents' performance measure. In a subjective promotion tourna- 
ment where the winner is determined by the principal's belief about 
the agents' ability, this paper shows that a noisy performance measure 
can have a positive incentive effect and a negative sorting effect. 
Therefore, it can be optimal for the principal to intentionally choose 
a noisy performance measure.
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I. Introduction
Tournament theory, à la Lazear and Rosen (1981), has been one of 
the key theoretical building blocks in the analysis of personnel policies 
within firms, especially in the analysis of promotions. The literature has 
extended the standard model in various directions, including multi-stage 
tournaments, asymmetric tournaments, and repeated tournaments, al- 
though the basic focus of the literature has been the incentive effects 
on the agents' efforts. However, promotions in typical organizations also 
serve as a sorting device to select the most able agent and re-assign 
him/her to the next higher (and often more skill-demanding) job level. 
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To incorporate the sorting effect of promotions, the current paper con- 
siders the subjective tournament model proposed by Kwon (2011). In a 
subjective tournament, the winner is determined by the principal's belief 
about the agents' ability. This means that the principal observes the 
agents' performance, updates her belief about the agents' ability, and 
promotes the agent with the highest expected ability. Note that this type 
of subjective tournament more closely resembles the actual promotion 
system in typical organizations than a standard tournament model, where 
the winner is chosen based only on the agents' realized performance.
In a subjective tournament, the principal has two objectives. First, she 
wants to maximize the agents' effort ( incentive effect). Second, the prin- 
cipal wants to maximize the precision of her expectation about the agents' 
abilities (sorting effect). Therefore, the subjective tournament model allows 
us to analyze the potential trade-offs between the incentive effect and 
the sorting effect in promotions.
In particular, the current paper shows that in a subjective tournament, 
the noise in the agents' performance measure can have positive incentive 
effects but negative sorting effects. Therefore, it is optimal for the prin- 
cipal to maintain some degree of noise (or uncertainty) in the agents' 
performance measure. This result contrasts with previous studies, where 
it is always optimal to minimize the noise in the performance measure 
due to its negative incentive effect (e.g., Hvide 2002).
These results may explain why some organizations use noisy and sub- 
jective performance measures (e.g., supervisors' performance ratings), 
even when objective performance data (e.g., sales records) are available. 
Alternatively, this paper suggests that in organizations with potentially 
heterogeneous agents, relying on objective and precise performance 
measures may only diminish the workers' incentives.
Intuitively, in a standard tournament model, the noise in the perfor- 
mance measure has negative incentive effects, because the winner is 
chosen by luck rather than by the agents' efforts. In contrast, in a sub- 
jective tournament, the principal can take into account the effect of the 
noise (or luck) in forming her belief about the agents' ability.
In a subjective tournament, this paper shows that when the noise in 
the performance measure increases, its incentive effect is ambiguous. 
When the noise in the performance measure increases, the principal's 
belief about the agents' ability depends more on her prior, rather than 
on, the agents' realized performance. Therefore, the agents have less in- 
centive to work hard to increase their performance. This means that the 
noise in the performance measure has a negative incentive effect. Note 
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that the reason for this negative incentive effect differs from that in the 
standard tournament model as discussed above.
Moreover, the importance of the sorting effect implies potentially large 
unobserved heterogeneity among the agents' abilities. Recall that agents 
work harder in a symmetric tournament where the agents' abilities are 
homogeneous (e.g., O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 1984; Kräkel and 
Sliwka 2004). When the noise in the performance measure increases, the 
agents are less certain about who has higher (or lower) ability, making 
the tournament more symmetric. Therefore, the noise in the performance 
measure can have a positive incentive effect.
For the sorting effect, the principal wishes to minimize the noise in 
the performance measure to form a more precise belief about the agents' 
ability. That is, the noise in the performance measure has a negative 
sorting effect. Due to these opposing effects, the current shows that it 
is optimal for the principal to maintain some degree of noise in the agents' 
performance measure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes 
the related literature. Section 3 introduces the basic model. In Section 
4, I consider the agents' choice of effort in a subjective tournament. 
Section 5 characterizes the principal's optimal choice of uncertainty in 
the agents' performance measure. Section 6 discusses the potential ex- 
tensions and conclusion.
II. Related Literature
There are a series of studies that analyze agents' choice of risk in a 
tournament setting (see, e.g., Hvide 2002; Kräkel and Sliwka 2004). 
Moreover, in a non-tournament setting, Hellwig (1994), Biais and 
Casamatta (1999), and Palomino and Prat (2003) have considered an 
agent's choice of effort and risk. However, in most of these studies, the 
principal's optimal choice of risk is trivial (that is, zero) and does not 
receive serious attention.
Many recent studies have explored the idea that a principal may inten- 
tionally withhold information on the agents' mid-term performance in a 
dynamic model. Some of these studies include Ederer (2009), Gershkov 
and Perry (2006), Goltsman and Mukherjee (2006), Kim (2005), Yildirim 
(2005), and Aoyagi (2010). However, in these models, the principal pri- 
vately observes the agents' mid-term performance. Therefore, the decision 
to release the mid-term performance information does not change the 
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principal's belief about the agents' ability, or the sorting effect of the 
tournament.
Note that the aforementioned studies are interested in maximizing the 
agents' effort (i.e., the incentive effect), not in selecting the highest ability 
agent (i.e., the sorting effect). There exists a related recent literature on 
sequential auctions and elimination contests that focuses on the effi- 
ciency of the sorting effects. See, for example, Moldovanu and Sela (2006), 
Mezzetti et al. (2008), Cai et al. (2007), and Wang and Zhang (2009). In 
this literature, however, the mid-term information revelation structure 
(i.e., uncertainty in the performance information) is exogenous.
Kwon (2011) also studied incentive and sorting effects in a subjective 
tournament. However, Kwon (2011) examined the choice of uncertainty 
and the choice of effort by the agents. In contrast, this paper considers 
a case where the principal chooses the uncertainty, while the agents 
choose their effort. For example, Kwon (2011) applies to a situation where 
the agents can choose the risk of their investments, while this paper 
applies to a situation where the principal can choose the accuracy of 
the agents' performance measure.
Using a contest model, Wang (2010) showed a similar result: there 
exists an optimal accuracy level, which maximizes the contestants' total 
effort. However, Wang (2010) takes the power contest success function, 
à la Tullock (1980), as given. In contrast, the current paper introduces 
the subjective tournament as a better model of the actual practice of 
promotions than the standard tournament model à la Lazear and Rosen 
(1981), and then derives the agents' winning probability. Furthermore, 
Wang (2010) does not discuss the sorting effect of promotions.
Kräkel (2012) considered competitive career contests, where the losers 
have different fall-back options depending on their productivity. He has 
shown that if the winner for a top position is chosen based on the players' 
performance only, the least productive player may have the highest pro- 
bability of winning the top position because s/he has worse fall-back 
positions than the others. In other words, career contests based on the 
players' performance can only lead to bad sorting for the top position. 
Thus, Kräkel (2012) is concerned about both the sorting and the incen- 
tive effects in career contests. However, in Kräkel (2012), the players' 
productivities are common knowledge. Thus, he does not analyze the 
choice of uncertainty about the players' productivity or performance 
measure.
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III. Model
Following the same notation as in Kwon (2011), suppose that there 
are two risk-neutral agents (i＝A, B). Neither the agents nor the principal 
observe the agents' ability η i. The prior distribution of η i is normal:
η i ~ N(m0, σ 0
2
). 
Note that the agents are ex-ante symmetric, but that their ability can 
be different ex-post.
There are two periods. In the first period, each agent's performance 
(yi1) is determined as follows: 
yi1＝η i＋ε i1, 
where ε i1 is a random noise.1
In the second period, each agent's performance (yi2) is determined as 
follows:
yi2＝η i＋ai＋ε i2, 
where ai is agent i ’s effort and ε i2 is a random noise. Assume that ε i1 
and ε i2 are iid normal, then we arrive at:
ε it ~ N(0, σ ε
2). 
The cost of effort is g(a)＝e
a－1.2
The principal does not observe the agents' effort ai. However, she can 
observe the realized performance of each agent, and update her belief 
about the agents' ability. At the end of the second period, the principal 
promotes the agent who has higher expected ability. This type of tourna- 
ment is called subjective tournament (Kwon 2011). Note that in a stand- 
ard tournament model, the agent who has higher realized performance 
wins the tournament. The promoted agent (the winner) receives the prize 
1 For simplicity, I assume that the agents do not exert effort in the first period. 
Relaxing this assumption should not change the qualitative results of this paper.
2 This functional form of the cost function allows a closed form solution for a 
simple analysis. However, the qualitative results of the paper should not change 
as long as the cost function is increasing and convex.
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M, while the loser receives the payoff m, where M＞m＞0.
Note that this model is motivated by typical promotion tournaments 
in a hierarchical organization, where performance in a higher level job 
is more sensitive to the agent's ability than performance in a lower level 
job (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Therefore, while the principal wants 
the agents to work hard in their current job levels, she also wants to 
promote the agent with the highest ability to a higher job level.
However, the agent with the highest performance is not necessarily 
the agent with the highest ability. For example, the agents may inten- 
tionally choose a risky strategy in a winner-take-all contest (Hvide 2002). 
Then, in this case, the agent with the highest realized performance is 
not necessarily the one with the highest ability. Furthermore, the agent 
with the highest ability may not work hard to win the tournament be- 
cause s/he has a better fall-back option from losing (Kräkel 2012). There- 
fore, to determine the winner in a promotion tournament, it can be bet- 
ter for the principal to rely on her belief about the agents' ability taking 
into account the agents' incentives for effort.
In this model, by Bayes' rule, the principal's posterior belief about 
player i’s ability η i conditional on the first and the second period perfor- 
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where a ̂i is the principal's expectation of agent i’s effort level.
An important departure from the previous literature is that I allow 
the principal to choose the noise in the performance measure, σ ε
2. As 
discussed above, some previous studies have allowed the agents, not 
the principal, to choose the noise or risk of their performance in a tourna- 
ment (see, e.g., Hvide 2002; Kräkel and Sliwka 2004; Kwon 2011).
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal chooses the 
noise in the performance measure, σ ε
2. Then, the first period performance 
is realized. In the second period, each agent simultaneously chooses his 
effort level and the second period performance is realized. Finally, the 
principal promotes the agent with the higher expected ability.
Note that the model does not specify the payoff function of the prin- 
cipal. For the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to assume that the 
principal's expected payoff increases with the agents' efforts and with 
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the precision of the expected agent's ability. In other words, the results 
of this paper are more general than those obtained with a specific payoff 
function of the principal.
IV. Agents' Choice of Effort
To solve the model backwards, I first consider the agents' choice of 
effort in the second period given σ ε
2, yA1, and yB1. From (1), without loss 
of generality, agent A would win the promotion if
E[η A|yA1, yB1, yA2, yB2] ≥ E[η B|yA1, yB1, yA2, yB2]
⇕
(η A＋εA2－η B－εB2) ≥ (a ̂A－a ̂B )－(aA－aB)－(yA1－yB1).
Note that conditional on the first period performance yA1 and yB1, 
ε ε
ε ε
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(2)
If I denote the cumulative distribution function of (η A＋εA2－η B－εB2) 
by F, then at the beginning of the second period, agent A's probability 
of winning given the first period performance is given by:
PA＝1－F ((aÂ－aB̂ )－(aA－aB )－(yA1－yB1)). 
Likewise, agent B's probability of winning given the first period perfor- 
mance is given by:
PB＝F ((a ̂A－a ̂B )－(aA－aB)－(yA1－yB1)). 
Then, given the first period performance, agent A's maximization problem 
in the second period is as follows:
max UA＝m＋PA(M－m )－g(aA ). 
                            aA≥0
If I denote the pdf of F by f, then the first order condition for agent 
A's optimal effort a*A is given by:
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∂UA    
    ＝f ((aÂ－a ̂B )－(a*A－a*B)－(yA1－yB1))(M－m)－g’(a*A)
∂aA                                                        (3)
    ＝f (－(yA1－yB1))(M－m)－g’(a*A)≤0,
where equality holds if a*A＞0. The second equality follows from the ra- 
tional expectations assumption, that is, a ̂A＝a*A and a ̂B＝a*B in equilib- 
rium.
Likewise, the first order condition for agent B's optimal effort a*B is 
given by:
∂UB
    ＝f (－(yA1－yB1))(M－m)－g’(a*B)≤0,               (4)
∂aB
where equality holds if a*B＞0.
Then, the agents' optimal choice of effort can be characterized as fol- 
lows:
Proposition 1. (i) Regardless of the first period performance (yA1, yB1), 




(ii) If |yA1－yB1| increases, then the effort level (a
* ) decreases.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Intuitively, in an asymmetric tournament, if the difference in ability 
between the agents increases, the agent with higher (expected) ability 
exerts less effort because he is likely to win anyway even with little effort. 
Furthermore, the agent with lower (expected) ability exerts less effort, 
because he is likely to lose even if he works hard. This means that the 
agents' effort levels largely depend on the difference in expected ability. 
Therefore, given that the agents are ex-ante symmetric in this model, 
their efforts in the second period are the same, because the perceived 
difference in their expected ability after the first period must be the 
same for both agents.
Furthermore, if yA1－yB1 increases, the posterior expected difference 
in the agents' ability increases. Therefore, both agents would work less 
(O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser 1984; Kräkel and Sliwka 2004).
V. Principal's Optimal Choice of Uncertainty
Next, I analyze the principal's optimal choice of uncertainty in the 
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performance measure. For precise sorting (i.e., to reduce the type I error 
of promotion), the principal must minimize the variance of her expected 
posterior belief. From (1), it is straightforward to show that the variance 
of her posterior belief about the agents' ability is increasing in σ ε
2. 
Therefore, for precise sorting, the principal should minimize σ ε
2.
If reducing σ ε
2 increases the agents' effort at the same time, then there 
would be no trade-off between the incentive effect and the sorting effect, 
and the principal chooses the smallest σ ε
2 possible. However, if reducing 
σ ε
2 decreases the agents' effort, there would be a potential trade-off 
between the incentive effect and the sorting effect, and the optimal σ ε
2 
can be strictly positive. Then, the principal may intentionally choose a 
noisy performance measure.
Recall that in a standard tournament model, reducing σ ε
2 increases 
the agents' effort (e.g., Hvide 2002). Therefore, the previous studies have 
not considered the potential trade-offs between incentive and sorting 
effects. However, in a subjective tournament, the following proposition 
shows that there can be a trade-off.
From (3) and (4), I can characterize the effect of σ ε
2 on the agents' 
expected optimal effort E[a* ] as follows:
Proposition 2. There exists s(σ 0
2
)＞0 such that
(i) if σ ε
2＞s(σ 0
2), E [a*] decreases in σ ε
2,
(ii) if σ ε
2＜s(σ 0
2), E[a*] increases in σ ε
2,
(iii) if σ ε
2＝0, then E [a*]＝0,
(iv) s(σ 0
2) increases in σ 0
2.
Proof. See Appendix. ■
Intuitively, the noise in the performance measure, σ ε
2, has two opposing 
incentive effects. First, if σ ε
2 increases, the agents' performance would 
reflect luck more than the agents' ability or effort. Then, from (1), the 
agents' performance would have little marginal effect on the principal's 
expectation of the agents ability. Therefore, if the noise in the perfor- 
mance measure (σ ε
2) increases, the agents would have less incentive for 
effort.
Second, if σ ε
2 increases, the difference in the agents' first period per- 
formance does not necessarily reflect the difference in the agents' ability. 
This means that if σ ε
2 increases, the tournament in the second period 
becomes more symmetric in terms of the expected ability of the agents. 
Then, as discussed above, the agents' would have more incentive to exert 
effort.
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Proposition 2 shows that if σ ε
2 is large enough relative to σ 0
2, the first 
negative incentive effect dominates the second positive effect. Thus, the 
agents' expected effort decreases in σ ε
2. However, if σ ε
2 is small enough 
relative to σ 0
2
, the second positive incentive effect dominates the first 
negative effect. Thus, the agents' expected effort increases in σ ε
2.
Now, let us suppose that the principal's payoffs increase in the agents' 
effort (given σ ε
2), and decrease in σ ε
2 (given effort). Note that I do not 
need to assume any specific functional form for the principal's payoff 
function.3
If σ ε
2＝0, the difference in the first period reveals the difference in 
ability for sure. Then, there would be no incentive for any effort in the 
second period. Therefore, assuming that the principal never wants the 
agents to choose zero effort, the principal would not choose σ ε
2＝0.
Then, I can state the following proposition for the optimal σ ε
2.
Proposition 3. The optimal σ ε




Proof. From Proposition 2, decreasing σ ε
2 leads to more effort if and 
only if σ ε
2＞s(σ 0
2
). Given that the principal's payoffs increase in the 
agents' effort and decrease in σ ε
2, if σ ε
2≥s(σ 0
2
), reducing σ ε
2 must lead 
to higher payoffs for the principal. Therefore, the optimal σ ε
2 must be 
less than s(σ 0
2
). ■
Note that even when the principal can choose a precise performance 
measure with σ ε
2＝0 for perfect sorting, the principal would still inten- 
tionally choose a noisy performance measure in order to increase the 
incentives for second period effort. This result contrasts with the conven- 
tional wisdom in agency models that the more precise the performance 
measure is, the better it would be. Therefore, Proposition 3 can provide 
a potential explanation for why some organizations use seemingly sub- 
jective and noisy performance measures (e.g., performance rating) instead 
of objective and precise performance measures (e.g., sales records).
Meanwhile, if sorting is not important, either because the agents are 
symmetric or because performance at higher job levels is not more sen- 
sitive to an agent's ability than that at lower job levels, then it would be 
optimal for the principal to minimize the noise in the agents' performance 
measure. These results may explain why, in promotion tournaments, 
some organizations seem to rely on objective performance measures while 
3 I do assume that the second order conditions for the principal's optimization 
problem are satisfied.
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others rely on the subjective opinion of the supervisors.4
Proposition 3 is also related to the recent literature on mid-term per- 
formance revelation discussed at the beginning. For example, Ederer 
(2009) shows that the principal may intentionally hide the information 
on agents' mid-term performance to increase the agents' incentives in 
the second period. It is worth emphasizing, however, that in Ederer 
(2009), the trade-off is between first period incentives and second period 
incentives. Proposition 2 shows that there is another mechanism, which 
drives the principal to choose a noisy performance measure, i.e., the 
trade-off between the sorting effect and the (second period) incentives 
effect.
VI. Conclusion
Theoretically, this paper uncovers two opposing incentive effects in a 
subjective tournament. When the noise in the performance measure in- 
creases, it has a negative incentive effect, because the principal does not 
trust the agents' performance. However, the noise in the performance 
measure also has a positive incentive effect because the agents do not 
learn much about the difference in their abilities and compete more 
vigorously. This paper provides a tractable tournament model, which com- 
bines both incentive effects and sorting effects.
With the growing importance of performance pay in many organiza- 
tions, it is crucial that we find ways by which to measure accurately 
the agents' performance. It is well-known that an imprecise performance 
measure can reduce incentives for risk-averse agents and distort the 
agents' task allocation. Consequently, much research and resources are 
devoted to develop more objective and precise performance measures. In 
contrast, this paper shows that it can be optimal to use a subjective and 
noisy performance measure, especially in promotion tournaments with 
heterogenous agents. An interesting empirical implication for future re- 
search is that in organizations with homogeneous agents, the performance 
measure is likely to be more objective and precise, while in organiza- 
tions with potentially heterogeneous agents, the performance measure 
4 In this case, there is a concern that skilled agents would not join an organ- 
ization with subjective tournaments because their ability is likely to be discounted 
by the principal's belief. However, it appears that the jobs using objective tour- 
naments and those using subjective tournaments are in different occupations or 
industries. As such, it would be difficult for skilled agents to avoid subjective tour- 
naments and join objective tournaments in different occupations or industries.
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS218
is likely to be relatively more subjective and imprecise. Perhaps more 
importantly, this paper shows that in the choice of performance measure 
for promotion tournaments, one should consider both incentive and 
sorting effects of promotions.
(Received 1 December 2011; Revised 25 January 2012; Accepted 23 
February 2012)
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) From (3) and (4), the first order conditions 
for players A and B are symmetric. Therefore, a*A＝a
*
B.
(ii) Without loss of generality, consider the posterior belief about player 
A's ability. The posterior mean and variance of η A conditional on the 
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The posterior mean and variance of η A conditional on the first and 
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Without loss of generality, suppose that yA1－yB1＞0. From (A.1), the 












)＞0＞－(yA1－yB1), from the symmetry of f, if (yA1－yB1) increases, 
f (－(yA1－yB1)) decreases. Therefore, the second period effort decreases 
with (yA1－yB1). ■
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Then, since g(a)＝ea－1, from (3) and (4), we can obtain the closed 
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It is straightforward to check that E[a*i] is maximized at 
ε
σσ σ σ σ
σ σ
= ≡ + +
+
4








Therefore, if σ ε
2＞s(σ 0
2
), E[a*] decreases in σ ε




increases in σ ε
2.
(iii) Moreover, if σ ε
2＝0, from (3) and (4), a*＝0 for all yA1 and yB1. 
Therefore, E[a*]＝0.
(iv) It is straightforward to check that s’(σ 0
2
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Kräkel, M. “Competitive Careers as a Way to Mediocracy.” European 
Journal of Political Economy 28 (No. 1 2012): 76-87.
  NOISY PERFORMANCE MEASURE IN PROMOTION TOURNAMENTS 221
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